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NORFOLK & WESTERN RAILWAY COMPANY v. AYERS: 
ASBESTOSIS-INFLICTED PLAINTIFFS AND 
FEAR OF CANCER CLAIMS 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the past asbestos was used in an extensive variety of products, “from 
hair dryers to roof tiles, disc brakes to lamps,”1 and in a wide variety of places 
such as hospitals and universities.2  As a result, “anyone who has ever entered 
a building more structurally complex than a dung-smeared hut has probably 
been exposed to asbestos.”3  Because it dissipates in heat and does not burn, 
asbestos was originally used as a safety product.4  The problem is that 
exposure to asbestos can lead to diseases from ranging from asbestosis to lung 
cancer to mesothelioma.5  Asbestos litigation began in the 1960s6 and was 
expected to be in decline around 2000.7  Instead of a decline, the turn of the 
century saw close to 200,000 cases in state and federal courts.8  One of these 
cases was Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. Ayers,9 a claim brought under the 
Federal Employers’ Liability Act (“FELA”)10 by six retired workers of the 
defendant railroad for their current lung problems and their fear of developing 
lung cancer sometime in the future.11 
 
 1. Innocent Hurt in Asbestos Suits, CHI. SUN-TIMES, July 3, 2001, at 21, available at 2001 
WL 7240088. 
 2. Douglas McLeod, Asbestos Continues to Bite Industry, BUS. INS., Jan. 8, 2001, available 
at 2001 WL 5100719. 
 3. The Need for Damage Limitation, FIN. TIMES-FT.COM, Nov. 15, 2001, available at 2001 
WL 28473877. 
 4. Innocent Hurt in Asbestos Suits, supra note 1, at 21. 
 5. LEE R. RUSS ET AL., ATTORNEY’S MED. ADVISOR § 90:6(b) (last updated Nov. 2002). 
 6. James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Asbestos Litigation Gone Mad: Exposure-
Based Recovery for Increased Risk, Mental Distress, and Medical Monitoring, 53 S.C. L. REV. 
815, 820 (2002). 
 7. McLeod, supra note 2. 
 8. Griffin B. Bell, Asbestos Litigation and Judicial Leadership, BRIEFLY . . . PERSPECTIVES 
ON LEGISLATION, REGULATION, AND LITIGATION, Vol. 6, No. 6 at preface (2002). 
 9. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. v. Ayers, 123 S. Ct. 1210 (2003). 
 10. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (2000). 
 11. Medill School of Journalism, At the Docket, at http://www.medill.northwestern.edu/ 
docket (last visited Jan. 8, 2004). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
368 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:367 
 
Emotional distress claims date from the 13th century with the tort of 
assault, a development from trespass.12  Almost one thousand years later, 
questions remain regarding the tort’s application.  In Consolidated Rail Corp. 
v. Gottshall13 the Supreme Court found that claims for damages for negligent 
infliction of emotional distress were cognizable under FELA, and it adopted 
the zone of danger test to evaluate such claims.14  In Metro-North Commuter 
Railroad Co. v. Buckley,15 the Court elaborated on the zone of danger test 
established in Gottshall and stated that exposure to asbestos was not sufficient 
for the “physical contact” requirement of the test.16  Ayers then required the 
Supreme Court to further explain emotional distress claims and to decide 
whether asbestosis was an injury for which one could recover emotional 
distress damages for a fear of developing cancer.17 
This note looks first at background information of the parties involved, 
asbestos and its associated diseases, and the Federal Employees Liability Act.  
Next it traces three important Supreme Court decisions leading up to the case 
at hand.  Then it examines the arguments of both sides, including a look at the 
briefs filed with the Supreme Court, judicial support for both sides, and the 
rival public policy arguments.  Then the majority and the dissenting opinions 
in Ayers will be analyzed.  Finally one possible solution to the problem will be 
introduced. 
II.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
A. Parties 
The plaintiffs, six retired employees of Norfolk & Western Railway 
Company (N&W), were exposed to asbestos while working for N&W, and 
years later all suffered from asbestosis and claimed that they were living in fear 
of developing lung cancer as a result of the exposure.18  The plaintiffs claimed 
that the asbestosis had impaired their daily lives — making it difficult for them 
 
 12. Terry Morehead Dworkin, Fear of Disease and Delayed Manifestation Injuries: A 
Solution or a Pandora’s Box?, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 527, 528 (1984); Andrew R. Klein, Fear of 
Disease and the Puzzle of Futures Cases in Tort, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 965, 971 (2002). 
 13. Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532 (1994). 
 14. See id. at 550, 555. 
 15. Metro-North Commuter Railroad Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424 (1997). 
 16. See id. at 432. 
 17. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at (i), Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Ayers, 123 S. Ct. 1210 
(2002) (No. 01-963) available at http://www.findlaw.com (last visited Jan. 8, 2004) [hereinafter 
Petition]. 
 18. Id. at 6; see Brief of Respondents at pp. 4-7, Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Ayers, 123 S. Ct. 
1210 (2003) (No. 01-963) available at 2002 WL 1964074 [hereinafter Respondents’ Brief]. 
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to walk short distances, talk, sing, and breathe.19  Freeman Ayers worked for 
N&W for about eleven years as a yard brakeman, a job that exposed him to 
asbestos.20  He also smoked about a pack of cigarettes per week for most of his 
life and later worked in automotive maintenance, a job that also subjected him 
to asbestos exposure.21  Doyle Johnson was employed by N&W for thirty-five 
years as a maintenance worker.22  He also smoked a pack of cigarettes per 
week.23  Clifford Vance was a “long-time laborer” for N&W.24  These three 
men all “worked where the asbestos stripping and reapplication occurred,” 
which resulted in inhaling asbestos.25  Carl Butler was exposed to asbestos for 
three months during his two or three years working at N&W.26  He later 
worked as a pipe fitter for thirty-three years, a job which also exposed him to 
asbestos, and smoked cigarettes for fifteen years.27  Though he experienced 
asbestos exposure for a relatively brief period during his time of employment 
with N&W, this exposure was especially intense — in a repair shop where 
asbestos was stripped and reapplied, making the air particularly dusty with 
asbestos.28  John Shirley worked for N&W for twenty-nine years, primarily as 
an office clerk with “minimal or no” exposure to asbestos.29  However, at times 
his job did require him to “handle asbestos sheets and clean up broken bags of 
asbestos.”30  James Spangler worked as a pipe fitter and carman for N&W for 
thirty-three years.31  These jobs entailed stripping asbestos from engines and 
reapplying it.32  In addition to his asbestosis, Spangler had developed 
emphysema from his cigarette smoking.33 
N&W began in 1838 in Virginia.34  At the time of its succession by 
Norfolk Southern it served fourteen states and a province of Canada.35  Norfolk 
 
 19. See Respondents’ Brief, supra note 18 at 24-25. 
 20. See Medill School of Journalism, supra note 11. 
 21. Id.; Petition, supra note 17, at 8.  At trial a doctor testified that the automotive job 
exposed Ayers to just as much asbestos as did his job at N&W and that Ayers’ smoking “more 
likely” led to his lung problems than did his asbestos exposure.  Medill School of Journalism, 
supra note 11. 
 22. Medill School of Journalism, supra note 11. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Respondents’ Brief, supra note 18, at 5 n.3. 
 26. Id.; Petition, supra note 17, at 8. 
 27. Medill School of Journalism, supra note 11; Petition, supra note 17, at 8. 
 28. Respondents’ Brief, supra note 18, at 5. 
 29. Petition, supra note 17, at 8; Medill School of Journalism, supra note 11. 
 30. Respondents’ Brief, supra note 18, at 5 n. 3. 
 31. Medill School of Journalism, supra note 11. 
 32. Respondents’ Brief, supra note 18, at 5 n. 3. 
 33. Medill School of Journalism, supra note 11. 
 34. Norfolk Southern Corporation, Our History, at http://www.nscorp.com/nscorp/index.jsp 
(last visited Jan. 8, 2004). 
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Southern, still based in Virginia, currently operates in twenty-two states, the 
District of Columbia, and Ontario.36  Today it is one of two major eastern 
railroads.37  In the 1930s N&W first became aware of the dangers associated 
with asbestos exposure but took none of the precautions recommended by the 
industry for protecting its employees.38  Nor did N&W inform any of the 
plaintiffs of this danger or how to reduce the amount of asbestos dust in the air 
or otherwise make the workplace less hazardous.39 
B. Procedural History 
The plaintiffs brought suit under FELA, alleging that N&W was negligent 
in exposing them to asbestos and in failing to provide them with a safe work 
environment.40  The jury awarded the six men over $5.8 million, with 
individual awards ranging from $770,640.00 to $1,230,806.00.41  Without 
issuing a written opinion, the trial judge reduced the awards to a total of $4.89 
million to “account for settlements that [the plaintiffs] had entered into with 
other non-FELA entities.”42  There are no intermediate appellate state courts in 
West Virginia and the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals denied 
N&W’s petition for review without comment.43  The United States Supreme 
Court granted N&W’s petition for review of whether emotional distress 
damages should be awarded under FELA though plaintiffs presented no 
evidence of physical manifestation or other corroboration of injury related to 
their alleged fear of cancer. 44 
 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Petition, supra note 17, at 3. 
 38. Respondents’ Brief, supra note 18, at 5 n.4. 
 39. Id. (referring to some methods of reducing the risk of asbestos exposure that include 
wetting down the dust and wearing a mask or respirator). 
 40. Petition, supra note 17, at 6; Respondents’ Brief, supra note 18, at 4. 
 41. Verdict Forms, Ayers. v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., No. 92-C-8888 (W.V. Cir. Ct. 1998).  
The breakdown is as follows: Ayers-$913,860, Johnson-$1,230,806, Butler-$1,047,000, Shirley-
$979,800, Spangler-$868,500, Vance-$770,640.  Id. 
 42. Respondents’ Brief, supra note 18, at 9; Petition, supra note 17, at 9. 
 43. Petition, supra note 17, at 10  (The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals had denied 
N&W’s petition for review without comment in a similar case, Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Dye). 
 44. Medill School of Journalism, supra note 11.  Like the West Virginia Supreme Court of 
Appeals, the United States Supreme Court had previously denied N&W’s petition for review in 
Dye.  See Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Dye, 533 U.S. 950 (2001) (mem.).  N&W presented another 
question for Supreme Court review in the case at hand: “Whether it was error for the court below, 
in conflict with decisions of the federal courts of appeals, state supreme courts and evolving 
common-law principles, not to apportion damages under FELA among tortfeasors.”  Petition, 
supra note 17, at (i).  This note will not address that question. 
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III.  ASBESTOS 
A. Generally 
Asbestos is a strong, flexible, fibrous mineral that is mined.45  Because it is 
resistant to fire, heat, and corrosion, it is used as an insulator.46  It is also used 
in asbestos-cement product, brake linings, and roofing and flooring products.47  
People have known about the dangers of asbestos for centuries.  For example, 
the ancient Roman historian Pliny referred to the “diseases of slaves” resulting 
from “the textile processes of preparing and weaving asbestos and flax.”48  The 
dangers associated with asbestos exposure faded out of the public 
consciousness until the late 1800s.49  By the end of the 1920s, however, 
scientists were writing about asbestos and its related diseases in medical 
journals, which in turn lead to greater awareness by doctors.50 
This knowledge did not stop manufacturers from using asbestos, though.  
From 1935-1965 industrial use of asbestos worldwide grew “dramatically” and 
millions of Americans were exposed to asbestos, within and outside of the 
workplace.51  It was not until 1975 that asbestos use was eliminated in the 
United States.52  Though asbestos use was eliminated over twenty-five years 
ago, people are still feeling the effects, for the “latency periods for asbestos-
related illnesses rang[e] from 15 to 40 years.”53  Around the time that asbestos 
use was eliminated the first asbestos-exposed worker was granted relief in 
court.54  Currently there are over 200,000 asbestos cases pending in United 
States courts.55 
 
 45. JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., THE INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, VARIATION IN ASBESTOS 
LITIGATION COMPENSATION AND EXPENSES 3 (1984). 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. BARRY I. CASTLEMAN, ASBESTOS: MEDICAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS 1 (4th ed. 1996) 
(internal quotations omitted).  Not only did the ancient Romans realize that asbestos caused 
disease, they also learned how to control amount of asbestos inhaled, for Pliny refers to “the use 
of transparent bladder skin as a respirator to avoid inhalation of dusts by the slaves.”  Id. 
 49. Id. at 2.  The modern asbestos industry began in the 1870s.  Id.  By the 1890s the dangers 
that asbestos posed to health were realized in Austria and Great Britain.  See id. at 2-3. 
 50. See id. at 6-10.  Around the same time some asbestos workers began to realize that jobs 
in asbestos plants were dangerous, probably from viewing the “impaired condition and deaths of 
those longest employed at the factories.”  Id. at 9.  However, manufacturers maintain that they 
had “no actual knowledge of a hazard to the users of their products before 1964.”  Id. at 388. 
 51. DEBORAH R. HENSLER, THE INSTITUTE FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, ASBESTOS LITIGATION IN 
THE UNITED STATES: A BRIEF OVERVIEW 5 (1991). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. See Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1089-92 (5th Cir. 1973). 
 55. Bell, supra note 8, at 3.  More than 50,000 cases are filed each year.  Id. at preface. 
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B. Asbestosis and Cancer 
When asbestos fibers are inhaled they “penetrate deeply into the lung 
. . . [and then] become coated with an iron protein.”56  These fibers can clog 
and scar the lungs, creating a disabling reduced ability to breathe known as 
asbestosis.57  The major characteristic of asbestosis is the development of 
hardened fibrous areas in the lung intersitium, the tissue between the air spaces 
in the lung.58  Those suffering from asbestosis usually first notice shortness of 
breath, and these complaints typically cause a medical professional to use X-
rays to identify the disease in the patient.59  This shortness of breath takes from 
ten to more than twenty years to develop, and “from the time that the disease 
becomes detectable, its course is progressive and irreversible, even if the 
victim thereafter avoids exposure to asbestos dust.”60  Other effects of 
asbestosis include pulmonary fibrosis and pleural effusions.61  Once the 
symptoms of asbestosis occur, they advance quickly.62 
Exposure to asbestos can also lead to a number of cancers, including 
cancer of the bronchials, lung, esophagus, stomach, colon, larynx, pharynx, 
and kidneys, and a form of cancer called malignant mesothelioma.63  
Mesothelioma is a rare tumor of the pleura, the membrane that lines the lungs 
and the thoracic cavity.64  Often the only signs that someone has mesothelioma 
are shortness of breath and chest pain, and most people die within a year of 
diagnoses.65  As with asbestosis, these cancers can take up to twenty years 
from the time of exposure to develop.66  Though many people have been 
exposed to asbestos, “only a small percentage suffer from asbestos-related 
 
 56. RUSS, supra note 5, § 90:6(b). 
 57. KAKALIK, supra note 45, at 3.  See also INT’L LABOUR OFFICE, SAFETY IN THE USE OF 
ASBESTOS 1 (1984). 
 58. RUSS, supra note 5, § 90:6(b). 
 59. Id.  Chest X-rays of those suffering from asbestosis have been described as having a 
“ground glass appearance.”  CASTELMAN, supra note 48, at 13.  The diagnoses of asbestosis is 
“helped by obtaining a history of regular exposure to any form of airborne asbestos.”  Ira Maden, 
Occupational Asthma and Other Respiratory Diseases, BRIT. MED. J., Aug. 3, 1996, at 291, 
available at 1996 WL 9008068. 
 60. RUSS, supra note 5, § 90:6(b). 
 61. Id. § 40:35. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. § 90:6(b); Maden, supra note 59. 
 64. RUSS, supra note 5, at § 90:6(b).  Mesothelioma is so closely related to asbestos that in 
Britain it is assumed that those suffering from mesothelioma got the disease because of their 
occupation.  Maden, supra note 59, at 291.  Mesothelioma is no longer a rare disease, for as of 
1996 there were over 1,000 deaths a year in Britain from mesothelioma.  C.A. Veys, 
Occupational Cancers, BRIT. MED. J., Sept. 7, 1996, at 615, available at 1996 WL 9008227. 
 65. Maden, supra note 59. 
 66. RUSS, supra note 55, at § 90:6(b). 
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physical impairment and . . . of the impairment group fewer still eventually 
develop lung cancer.”67 
Courts have found that asbestosis and cancer are “separate and distinct 
latent diseases that are not medically linked.”68  Asbestosis is not a cancerous 
process, and there is no relation between the “pathologies of asbestosis and 
cancer, except that the diseases can be precipitated by the same pathogen or 
carcinogen.”69  Though the diseases are independent of one another, they both 
result from exposure to asbestos.  One author has found that those who have 
asbestosis have a five times greater risk of developing lung cancer.70  “Over 
40% of people with asbestosis die of lung cancer, and 10% die of 
mesothelioma.”71 
IV.   FELA 
The Federal Employers’ Liability Act72 was enacted to facilitate recovery 
for railworkers who have suffered injuries as a result of their employers’ 
negligence.73  It was “designed to put on the railroad industry some of the cost 
for the legs, eyes, arms, and lives which it consumed in its operations.”74  
Though FELA focuses on injuries and death from accidents, it also includes 
“any injury resulting in whole or ‘in part from the negligence’ of the carrier.”75  
It also eliminated a number of tort defenses traditionally relied on by defendant 
railroads, including the fellow servant rule and the assumption of risk 
 
 67. In re Haw. Fed. Asbestos Cases, 734 F. Supp. 1563, 1570 (D. Haw. 1990). 
 68. Pierce v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 464 A.2d 1020, 1025 (Md. 1983); see also Jackson 
v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 727 F.2d 506, 517 (5th Cir. 1984) (“asbestosis and cancer are 
distinct diseases”); Wilson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 684 F.2d 111, 117 n.33 (D.C. Cir. 
1982) (Ginsburg, Circuit Judge) (“asbestosis and mesothelioma are separate and distinct diseases, 
and . . . mesothelioma is not a complication of the former.”); Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. Cox, 
481 So. 2d 517, 522 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (“It is widely accepted by the scientific 
community that asbestosis and cancer are not medically linked, that is, cancer is not an outgrowth 
or complication of asbestosis.”). 
 69. Jackson, 727 F.2d. at 517. 
 70. Veys, supra note 64.  Smokers who are exposed to asbestos also have a greater risk of 
developing lung cancer.  Id.  Smokers with asbestosis have an even greater risk of developing 
lung cancer.  Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (2000). 
 73. Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 181 (1949) (“When the statute was enacted, Congress’ 
attention was focused primarily upon injuries and death resulting from accidents on interstate 
railroads.”). 
 74. Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 53, 68 (1949) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 75. Urie, 337 U.S. at 181. 
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defense.76  The wording of FELA is “not restrictive as to the employees 
covered; the cause of injury, except that it must constitute negligence 
attributable to the carrier; or the particular kind of injury resulting.”77  Because 
of this “all inclusive” wording and its “remedial and humanitarian purpose,” 
courts have been liberal in their construction of FELA.78  However, FELA is 
not a “workers’ compensation statute.”79  Nor does it “make the employer an 
insurer.”80  FELA is a federal statute, but it “generally turns on principles of 
common law.”81 
In the fifteen years prior to Ayers the Supreme Court had considered three 
main cases involving claims for emotional distress under FELA.  Each one 
answered a question left unanswered by the previous case. 
V.  JUDICIAL BACKGROUND 
A. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Buell — Raising the 
Question of Emotional Distress Claims under FELA 
Buell filed a FELA complaint against his employer, Atchison, Topeka & 
Santa Fe Railway Company, alleging that the railway had failed to provide him 
with a safe workplace.82  Included in his complaint were allegations that he 
was harassed, threatened, and intimidated by his fellow employees and his 
supervisor.83  After the district judge granted summary judgment for the 
railway, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals proclaimed that a relevant issue, 
 
 76. See 45 U.S.C. §§ 51, 54 (2000).  FELA also afforded for comparative, rather than 
contributory, negligence and prohibited the railroad from contracting to avoid liability.  See id. §§ 
53, 55. 
 77. Urie, 337 U.S. at 181. 
 78. Id. at 181-82 (FELA covers occupational diseases such as silicosis and not only injuries 
and deaths caused by accidents); Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426, 432 (1958) 
(“Congress intended the creation of no static remedy, but one which would be developed and 
enlarged to meet changing conditions and changing concepts of industry’s duty toward its 
workers.”); Jamison v. Encarnacion, 281 U.S. 635, 640 (1930) (“[The Act is not to] be narrowed 
by refined reasoning . . . .  It is to be construed liberally to fulfill the purposes for which it was 
enacted . . . .”); see also Rogers v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 506 (1957) (applying a 
relaxed standard of causation under FELA). 
 79. Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 543 (1994). 
 80. Inman v. Baltimore & Ohio Ry. Co., 361 U.S. 138, 140 (1959); Ellis v. Union Pac. Ry. 
Co., 329 U.S. 649, 653 (1947) (FELA “does not make the employer the insurer of the safety of 
his employees while they are on duty.  The basis of his liability is his negligence, not the fact that 
injuries occur.”). 
 81. Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 543; Urie, 337 U.S. at 182 (“the Federal Employers’ Liability Act 
is founded on common-law concepts of negligence and injury, subject to such qualifications as 
Congress has imported into those terms”). 
 82. See Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Buell, 480 U.S. 557, 559 (1987). 
 83. Id. 
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one raised by neither of the parties nor the district court, was “whether a 
Railroad employee’s wholly mental injury stemming from his railroad 
employment is compensable under the [FELA].”84  Concerning this issue on 
appeal, the Supreme Court found that the record was “insufficiently 
developed” at that time to allow either the Supreme Court or the Ninth Circuit 
“to express an opinion on [Buell’s] ultimate chances of recovery under the 
FELA.”85  Though the Court did not get a chance to decide the issue or 
comment on it in detail, the issue of emotional distress damages for a FELA 
action was raised by the Supreme Court, foreshadowing the question that 
would be presented seven years later in Gottshall. 
B. Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall — Adopting the Zone of Danger Test 
1. Facts 
Seven years after dismissing the question of “whether the term ‘injury’ as 
used in the FELA includes purely emotional injury” in Buell,86 the Court 
revisited the issue in Gottshall. 87  Gottshall was working in the hot sun when 
his friend and co-worker collapsed.  Gottshall revived his co-worker for a 
while, but within five minutes the co-worker collapsed again and died, despite 
Gottshall’s administration of CPR.  Gottshall was then ordered to continue 
working, within sight of the covered body.  Later Gottshall became 
“preoccupied with the events surrounding (the co-worker’s) death” 88 and was 
eventually admitted to a psychiatric institution for three weeks. 
Carlisle, whose case was consolidated with that of Gottshall, was forced to 
take on additional duties at his already stressful job when there were cutbacks 
at work.  He received a promotion that led to more responsibilities and made 
him work irregular hours.  He then began to experience “insomnia, headaches, 
depression, weight loss, and eventually a nervous breakdown.”89 
2. Court’s Analysis 
 
 84. Id. at 560-61, (citing Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Buell, 771 F.2d 1320, 
1323-24 (9th Cir. 1985)) (punctuation in original) (the Court of Appeals noted that this question 
was “one of first impression in this circuit.”). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 557. 
 87. Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532 (1994) (all facts articulated in this section 
are taken from the Court’s opinion in Gottshall). 
 88. Id. at 536. 
 89. Id. at 539. 
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The Court recognized that recovery for infliction of emotional distress, 
though not explicitly addressed in FELA, is available under the statute.90  
Though FELA mainly centers on physical injuries, its wording is simply 
“injury,” which includes emotional as well as physical injuries.91  However, 
the Court needed a way to evaluate emotional distress claims.92  Looking at 
three major limiting tests that had developed in common law: the “physical 
impact” test, the “zone of danger” test, and the “relative bystander” test, the 
Court came to the conclusion that “an emotional injury constitutes ‘injury’ 
resulting from the employer’s ‘negligence’ for purposes of FELA only if it 
would be compensable under the terms of the zone of danger test.”93  
According to the zone of danger test, those who sustain a physical impact or 
are placed in immediate risk of physical harm as a result of a defendant’s 
negligent conduct may recover for emotional injuries.94 
The Court adopted the zone of danger test for a number of reasons.  First, it 
had been adopted by several jurisdictions at the time FELA was enacted.95  
Second, at the time Gottshall was decided, the test was used by fourteen 
jurisdictions so it fulfilled the FELA requirement of turning on common law.96  
Third, the zone of danger test is consistent with FELA, which, by imposing 
liability on employers for injuries and deaths caused by the dangers of working 
on the railroad, also encourages employers to improve safety measures.97  The 
Court concluded that allowing railroad employees to recover for both physical 
and emotional injuries that “threaten them imminently with physical impact” 
caused by the negligent conduct of their employers would further the goals of 
FELA.98 
 
 90. See id. at 550.  The Court easily arrived at this conclusion by looking at the history of 
emotional distress claims, state common law, and the remedial purpose of FELA.  Id.  Although 
pain and suffering technically are mental harms, these terms traditionally “have been used to 
describe sensations stemming directly from a physical injury or condition.”  Id. (citing Richard N. 
Pearson, Liability to Bystanders for Negligently Inflicted Emotional Harm—A Comment on the 
Nature of Arbitrary Rules, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 477, 485 n.45 (1982)).  The Court therefore 
defined emotional distress as “mental or emotional harm (such as fright or anxiety) that is caused 
by the negligence of another and that is not directly brought about by a physical injury, but that 
may manifest itself in physical symptoms.  Id. at 544. 
 91. Id. at 556. 
 92. See Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 556. 
 93. Id. at 546-49, 555. 
 94. Id. at 548 (“Those within the zone of danger of physical impact can recover for fright, 
and those outside of it cannot.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 95. Id. at 547. 
 96. Id. at 555. 
 97. Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 555; Lancaster v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 773 F.2d 807, 813 (7th 
Cir. 1985) (FELA is designed to assure “the security of the person from physical invasions or 
menaces.”). 
 98. Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 556. 
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Using the zone of danger test, Gottshall’s case was remanded for 
reconsideration.99  Carlisle’s claim did not meet the requirements of the zone 
of danger test, and the Court ruled for Carlisle’s employer.100 
Gottshall’s recognition of an emotional injury as an “injury” under FELA 
and adopting the zone of danger test was important guidance for lower courts.  
However, it left an unanswered question: what is an “impact” for the zone of 
danger test? 
C. Metro-North Commuter Railroad Company v. Buckley — Defining 
Physical Impact 
Decided three years after Gottshall, Metro-North Commuter Railroad Co. 
v. Buckley101 faced the Court with the decision “whether the physical contact 
with insulation dust that accompanied [plaintiff’s] emotional distress amounts 
to a ‘physical impact’ as th[e] Court used that term in Gottshall,” that is, if 
physical contact with insulation dust was a physical impact within the zone of 
danger test.102  In Buckley the plaintiff’s pipefitting job of three years exposed 
him to asbestos.103  After attending an “asbestos awareness” class, he began to 
fear that he would develop cancer.104 
Focusing on the “physical impact” requirement from Gottshall and 
precedent from state courts requiring a threatened physical contact that caused, 
or might have caused, physical harm before recovery for emotional distress 
was allowed, the Court found that every form of “physical contact” does not 
constitute a “physical impact.”105  Specifically, “contact that amounts to no 
more than an exposure . . . to a substance that poses some future risk of 
disease” is not a “physical impact” under the zone of danger test.106  The Court 
also noted that “with only a few exceptions, common-law courts have denied 
recovery to those who, like Buckley, are disease and symptom free.”107  
“Therefore the Court suggested that judges should permit recovery only when 
facing scenarios that present fewer of the problems that led courts to disallow 
 
 99. Id. at 558. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Metro-North Commuter Ry. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424 (1997). 
 102. Id. at 428-29. 
 103. Id. at 427. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 430-32. 
 106. Buckley, 521 U.S at 432. 
 107. Id. at 432.  This is important since common law principles help to guide FELA.  See id. 
at 429. 
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emotional distress actions in the first place.”108  “Simply pointing to physical 
contact with asbestos dust, however, does not satisfy this criterion.”109 
In deciding that Buckley did not state a claim for relief for emotional 
distress damages, the Court also focused on public policy reasoning.110  Courts 
would have difficulty in separating meritorious from trivial emotional distress 
claims if evidence of the type submitted by Buckley was enough to prevail on 
such a claim.111  Courts would also have problems separating meritorious from 
trivial claims if contact with a carcinogen met the physical impact requirement 
of the zone of danger test, for “contact, even extensive contacts, with serious 
carcinogens are common.”112  The Court was also concerned about a “flood” of 
litigation that would possibly result if Buckley’s claim were meritorious.113  
The costs associated with such a flood of litigation might “become so great 
that, given the nature of the harm, it would seem unreasonable to require the 
public to pay the higher prices that may result.”114  Another possible result of 
this potential flood of litigation is that workers who actually develop a disease 
might not be able to recover from a company with limited resources that has 
already had to compensate people suffering from emotional distress of future 
disease.115 
In addition to his claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress, 
Buckley also sought recovery for the costs of future medical checkups for 
cancer and other diseases associated with asbestos exposure.116  Without giving 
definitive guidance as to possible solutions for the problem of exposure that 
has not yet (or may never) result in disease, “the Court seemed to suggest that 
it is unwise for a court to award future medical monitoring costs to a plaintiff 
 
 108. Klein, supra note 12, at 974. 
 109. Id. 
 110. See Buckley, 521 U.S. at 433-36. 
 111. See id. at 433-34.  Buckley’s only evidence of emotional distress was his own testimony.  
Id. at 433.  In fact, he returned to working with asbestos though he could have transferred and his 
medical doctor did not refer him to a psychiatrist.  Id. 
 112. Id. at 434.  In support of this proposition, the Court cited a study showing that “43% of 
American children lived in a home with at least one smoker, and 37% of adult nonsmokers lived 
in a home with at least one smoker or reported environmental tobacco smoke at work.”  Id. at 
434-35 (citing Pirkle et al., Exposure of the US Population to Environmental Tobacco Smoke, 275 
J. Am. Med. Ass’n 1233, 1237 (1996)). 
 113. Id. at 435. 
 114. Id. 
 115. See Buckley, 521 U.S. at 435-36. 
 116. Id. at 438. 
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who has neither severe emotional distress nor a demonstrable increased risk of 
developing a disease . . . .”117 
Though Buell, Gottshall, and Buckley have helped to define what 
emotional distress injuries are compensable under FELA, none answered a 
question that has arisen in lower courts, namely whether physical manifestation 
is necessary for an emotional distress claim.  This is the issue that arose in 
Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. Freeman Ayers. 
VI.   PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS 
A. Norfolk and Western Railway Company 
1. Argument Submitted by N&W to the Supreme Court 
In petitioning the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, Norfolk & 
Western Railway Company presented two questions: (1) Whether it was an 
error for the trial court to award emotional distress damages under FELA to 
plaintiffs who presented no evidence of physical manifestation or other 
corroboration of injury related to their alleged fear of cancer?118  (2) Whether it 
was an error for the trial court not to apportion damages under FELA among 
tortfeasors?119  This note will focus solely on the first question. 
N&W’s claim centered on the assertion that “there is a conflict of authority 
as to whether FELA plaintiffs may recover emotional-distress damages without 
any corroborating manifestation of emotional injury.”120  N&W contended that 
there are two common law limitations on emotional distress claims: the “zone 
of danger test,” embraced by the Court in Gottshall; and “that emotional 
injury, in order to be compensable, must be corroborated by physical 
manifestations (or objective medical symptoms) of injury.”121  This second 
limitation had not been specifically addressed by the Court previously.122 
 
 117. Matthew D Hamrick, Comment, Theories of Injury and Recovery for Post-Exposure, 
Pre-Symptom Plaintiffs: The Supreme Court Takes a Critical Look, 29 CUMB. L. REV. 461, 464 
(1998-99). 
 118. Petition, supra note 17, at (i). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 11. 
 121. Id. 
 122. In her dissenting opinions in both Gottshall and Buckley, Justice Ginsburg has brought 
attention to just this issue.  Metro-North Commuter Ry. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 445 (1997) 
(Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (Buckley’s contact with 
asbestos “constituted ‘physical impact’” but his emotional distress claim failed “because Buckley 
did not present objective evidence of severe emotional distress.”); Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 
512 U.S. 532, 571(1994) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“One solution to this problem—a solution the 
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First, N&W looked to Gottshall’s declaration that pain and suffering 
“traditionally have been used to describe sensations stemming directly from a 
physical injury or condition.”123  The physical injury or condition claimed by 
these plaintiffs was asbestosis.124  However, because cancer is not caused by 
asbestosis, fear of cancer cannot stem directly from the asbestosis.125  
Therefore, the damages awarded to the plaintiffs at trial could only be awarded 
for negligently inflicted emotional distress and not for pain and suffering.126  
However, in order to recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress 
under FELA, which incorporates the common law, two common law 
restrictions must be observed.127  The first restriction is that not all conduct is 
actionable.128  For example, in FELA suits containing a stand-alone emotional 
distress claim, the zone of danger test must be met in order for conduct to be 
actionable, as decided in Gottshall.129  The second common law restriction is 
that plaintiffs must present some objective evidence of a manifestation of their 
injuries.130  Most jurisdictions comply with this limitation.131 
N&W contended that the plaintiffs in this case had not presented objective 
evidence of their fear of cancer.  One plaintiff’s “fear” of developing cancer 
made him “think, occasionally.”132  Another testified that what worried him the 
most about cancer was “if there’s nobody to take care of the farm or 
anything.”133  Yet another offered no testimony at all regarding any concern 
about contracting cancer.134  None of the plaintiffs testified as to having a 
“fear” of cancer or the existence of severe emotional injury, and none 
 
Court does not explore—would be to require such ‘objective medical proof’ and to exclude, as 
too insubstantial to count as ‘injury,’ claims lacking this proof.”). 
 123. Petition, supra note 17, at 12 (citing Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 544 (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 124. See id. at 12. 
 125. See id.; see also Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 863 P.2d 795, 805 (Cal. 1993) 
(Pain and suffering damages are “parasitic damages” which compensate “a reasonable fear of a 
future harm attributable to the injury.”). 
 126. See Petition, supra note 17, at 12. 
 127. See id. at 13. 
 128. See id. 
 129. See id. 
 130. See id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A (2003).  “If the actor’s 
conduct is negligent as creating an unreasonable risk of causing either bodily harm or emotional 
disturbance to another, and it results in such emotional disturbance alone, without bodily harm or 
other compensable damage, the actor is not liable for such emotional disturbance.”  Id. 
 131. Petition, supra note 17, at 13-14. 
 132. Id. at 8. 
 133. Id. at 8-9. 
 134. Id. at 9. 
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presented evidence of any emotional or physical manifestation of their 
concerns.135 
Though the second restriction on emotional distress claims that are 
actionable (the physical manifestation requirement) had not been directly 
addressed by the Supreme Court, the Court had previously recognized the 
requirement.  In Buell, the Court recognized that “severe emotional injury . . . 
has generally been required to establish liability for purely emotional 
injury.”136  In Gottshall, the “Court addressed the second limitation only in the 
context of rejecting the claim that the genuine-injury requirement obviated the 
need to restrict what conduct is actionable.”137  In Buckley, the Court simply 
“reiterate[d] Gottshall’s admonition that the test for the genuineness of 
emotional injury ‘alone’ is insufficient to safeguard defendants from meritless 
claims.”138 
2. Judicial Support for N&W’s Argument 
N&W listed a number of cases supporting its view that claims for 
emotional distress must be accompanied by some form of physical 
manifestation.139  In Moody v. Maine Central Railroad Co.,140 Moody alleged 
that his railroad employer caused his emotional distress by subjecting him to 
harassment, denying his admission into an engineer training program, 
assigning him to unattractive location, and denying his qualification on certain 
runs; actions which supposedly led to Moody’s fatigue and depression which 
in turn led to attacks of angina.141  Though there was evidence that Moody 
visited a number of doctors, there was “absolutely no evidence that any one of 
the doctors indicated that the so-called harassment by defendant’s supervisors 
was the cause of any symptom exhibited by the plaintiff.”142  The First Circuit 
Court of Appeals found that Moody’s condition, “manifested only by 
subjective pain” and supported by no “medical opinion as to causation,” was 
not enough to state a claim for emotional distress.143 
 
 135. Id. 
 136. Petition, supra note 17, at 15 (citing Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Buell, 480 
U.S. 557, 567 n.13 (1987)). 
 137. Id. at 17; see Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 552 (1994). 
 138. Petition, supra note 17, at 15; see Metro-North Commuter Ry. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 
424, 434 (1997). 
 139. See Petition, supra note 17, at 16-17. 
 140. Moody v. Maine Central Ry. Co., 823 F.2d 693 (1st Cir. 1987). 
 141. See id. at 693. 
 142. Id. at 695. 
 143. Id. at 696. 
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Ten years prior to Moody, the First Circuit decided Bullard v. Central 
Vermont Railway, Inc.,144 in which Gonyer claimed emotional injuries after a 
train on which he was working collided with another.  Gonyer jumped from the 
train before the impact, but other workers died in the collision.  After the 
accident, Gonyer remained at the site for hours, setting up flares to warn other 
trains and directing traffic.  The only evidence of Gonyer’s emotional distress 
was his testimony that his job required him to pass the accident site nearly 
every day and that he expected to see the deceased members of the crew 
waiting for him there.  In denying recovery, the First Circuit found that “if 
there is to be compensation for nervousness, depression, or other mental 
conditions which may sometimes result from harrowing experiences of this 
sort, there must be evidence from which a jury can make an informed 
judgment as to the existence, nature, duration and seriousness of the 
condition.”145 
State supreme courts have also examined emotional distress claims without 
physical manifestations.  In Vance v. Consolidated Rail Corp.,146 the Supreme 
Court of Ohio found that plaintiff Vance’s claim for negligent infliction of 
emotional distress could stand because “there was sufficient medical evidence 
to establish that plaintiff was suffering from chronic and disabling 
depression.”147  After Vance’s employer, Erie, merged with Penn Central, Penn 
Central workers began harassing Vance by, among other things, placing a dead 
bloody rat on his lunch, putting sugar in the gas tank of his wife’s car, and 
almost running down Vance with a truck.  This led to Vance being diagnosed 
as clinically depressed and being treated with electric shock therapy, 
tranquilizers, and antidepressants. 
The Supreme Court of Alabama also looked at emotional distress claims in 
connection with physical manifestations.  In Alabama Great Southern Railroad 
Co. v. Jackson,148 supervisory employees of the defendant railroad, after 
warning Jackson to be on the lookout for vandals on the train, conducted a 
surprise and secret evaluation of Jackson and his crew.  They concealed their 
presence and, when Jackson heard them moving in the dark, would not respond 
to his question of “Who is that?”  When Jackson approached the place from 
which he heard their noises the supervisory employees finally revealed 
themselves.  The next morning Jackson began to experience chest pains and a 
 
 144. Bullard v. Central Vermont Ry., Inc., 565 F.2d 193 (1st Cir. 1977) (all facts in this 
section are articulated from the court’s opinion in Bullard). 
 145. Id. at 197. 
 146. Vance v. Consol. Ry. Corp., 652 N.E.2d, 776 (Ohio 1995) (all facts in this section are 
articulated from the court’s opinion in Vance). 
 147. See id. at 784. 
 148. Alabama Great Southern Railroad Co. v. Jackson, 587 So. 2d 959 (Ala. 1991) (all facts 
in this section are articulated from the court’s opinion in Jackson). 
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severe headache, which continued for several days.  Jackson eventually was 
placed in the hospital for a series of tests and was prescribed medication for his 
chest pains and headaches.  The Alabama Supreme Court upheld a jury verdict 
in Jackson’s favor because the defendant had caused an injury that resulted in 
Jackson’s physical problems.149 
3. Public Policy Support for N&W’s Argument 
Many courts and scholars have spent time analyzing emotional distress 
claims for a fear of cancer or other disease, in legal terms and also in terms of 
public policy.150  One such common concern is that asbestos cases are clogging 
the courts.151  Allowing plaintiffs to bring cases for fear of cancer instead of 
only allowing cases to be brought for present injuries contributes to this 
congestion.  One author has reported that there are currently more than 
“200,000 asbestos-related cases pending in state and federal courts, and that 
number is growing at the rate of more than 50,000 new cases every year.”152  
That number is up from 20,000 in 1982.153  Certain jurisdictions with 
reputations as being plaintiff-friendly, including certain counties in West 
Virginia, are especially hard hit by the amount of asbestos litigation.154  For 
example, one county in Mississippi with 9,740 residents had 21,000 plaintiffs 
file claims from 1995 to 2000.155  The Supreme Court has even commented on 
the “elephantine mass of asbestos cases.”156  Recognizing the enormity of the 
 
 149. See id. at 965. 
 150. See, e.g., Metro-North Commuter Ry. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 442-43 (1997); 
Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 750 F.2d 1314, 1335-38 (5th Cir. 1985); In re Haw. Fed. 
Asbestos Cases, 734 F. Supp. 1563, 1566-67 (D. Haw. 1990); Henderson, supra note 6, at 831-
34; Klein, supra note 12, at 974, 990-91; Paul F. Rothstein, What Courts Can Do in the Face of 
the Never-Ending Asbestos Crisis, 71 MISS. L.J. 1, 1-8 (2001). 
 151. Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 557 (1994) (noting that the “common law 
restricts recovery for negligent infliction of emotional distress on several policy grounds: the 
potential for a flood of trivial suits . . .). 
 152. Bell, supra note 8, at preface.  In the year 2000 alone, 60,000 claims were filed against 
the Manville Trust—a trust established to handle asbestos claims against Johns-Manville Corp.  
Rothstein, supra note 150, at 4.  The Manville Trust has now been “so drained by claims that [as 
of November, 2001] it could . . . pay only five cents on the dollar of claims, down from 10 cents 
only a few months ago.”  The Need for Damage Limitation, supra note 3.  In filing for 
bankruptcy, W.R. Grace & Co. stated that in 2000 asbestos claims had increased 81% over the 
prior year, reaching a total of 49,000 claims.  Rothstein, supra note 150, at 5.  “Moreover, in 
January of 2001, claims against W.R. Grace had increased 374% over those in January of 2000, 
and February of 2001 claims were 207% higher than February of 2000.”  Id. 
 153. Bell, supra note 8, at preface. 
 154. Id. at 17 (other states include Texas, Louisiana, New York, and California). 
 155. Id. (citing Robert Pear, Mississippi Gaining as Lawsuit Mecca, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 
2001, at Section A). 
 156. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 821 (1999). 
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situation, in 1990 Chief Justice Rehnquist convened a Judicial Conference 
Committee to examine the growing asbestos litigation problem.157  In 1991 the 
committee reported that the “situation has reached critical dimensions and is 
getting worse,” and it concluded that the courts were “ill-equipped” to address 
the mass of claims in an effective manner.158 
Another concern about the number of asbestos cases, including those 
concerning claims for fear of cancer, is that the lawsuits are bankrupting 
companies at an alarming pace.  As of 2000, twenty-five of the more than 140 
businesses that either made asbestos or sold products containing the substance 
had filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.159  For example, power-plant builder 
Babcock & Wilcox had settled 349,000 claims for $1.6 billion but had to file 
for bankruptcy protection, estimating its asbestos liability would be an 
additional $1.3 billion through 2012.160  Analysts have surmised that the total 
across American industry may reach $50 billion and take fifty years to settle.161  
These bankruptcies lead plaintiffs to seek compensation from “peripheral” 
defendants who only have a remote correlation with asbestos since larger, 
more culpable companies have already filed for bankruptcy.162  This has a 
domino effect that results in additional defendants filing for bankruptcy.163 
A third concern about letting plaintiffs recover for a fear of cancer is that 
those who truly are sick and suffering may face a depleted pool of assets from 
which to recover.164  It has been estimated that between 50% and 80% of new 
 
 157. Rothstein, supra note 150, at 7. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Queena Sook Kim, Firms Hit by Asbestos Litigation Take Bankruptcy Route, WALL ST. 
J., Dec. 21, 2000, at B4, available at 2000 WL WSJ 26620724.  In 2000 alone, five 
manufacturers and users of asbestos products were forced into bankruptcy, which is the largest 
one-year total of asbestos-related bankruptcies in at least a decade.  McLeod, supra note 2. 
 160. Kim, supra note 159. 
 161. The Asbestos Blob, WALL ST. J., July 2, 2001, at A14, available at 2001 WL WSJ 
2868353. 
 162. See Rothstein, supra note 150, at 3.  See also The Need for Damage Limitation, supra 
note 3 (since “virtually all the traditional asbestos companies have already been sued into 
bankruptcy,” others are now suing “those who installed asbestos products, or used them as 
building materials (at a time when the stuff was a cliché of contemporary construction), or 
manufactured masks to keep the dust at bay.”); McLoed, supra note 2 (Non-traditional defendants 
include “giants like IBM, AT&T, Ford Motor Co. and Chrysler Corp.—accused of exposing 
workers to asbestos-contaminated break parts . . . as well as institutions like hospitals and 
universities with small amounts of asbestos in their buildings.”). 
 163. McLeod, supra note 2.  For example, despite USG laying off 500 employees to free up 
$10 million for legal bills, it had to file for bankruptcy because “it was the only way to stop 
taking hits for companies that had already filed.”  The Asbestos Blob, supra note 161. 
 164. See The Need for Damage Limitation, supra note 3 (“But for every healthy claimant who 
demands compensation now for suffering that may never arise, there is a dying victim whose pain 
cannot be compensated because the defendants have run out of money settling dubious claims.”). 
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asbestos cases are brought by plaintiffs who are “not sick in a meaningful 
sense.”165  These claimants who are not sick not only add to the problems 
associated with clogging the courts and lead to more companies filing for 
bankruptcy, but more importantly they “reduce the limited pool of resources 
available for those individuals who are much sicker or dying or will become 
sick with serious asbestos-related diseases in the future.”166  For example, six 
plaintiffs in Mississippi were awarded $150 million dollars for their asbestos 
exposure, though none was sick.167  Twenty-one plaintiffs in Texas suffering 
mild to asympotmatic asbestosis were awarded $115.6 million, much of it for 
future damages.168 
Another concern with allowing recovery for fear of cancer is that it will be 
difficult to distinguish between valid distress and fear that is trivial.169  As is 
stated in the Restatement: 
(I)n the absence of the guarantee of genuineness provided by resulting bodily 
harm, . . . emotional disturbances may be too easily feigned, depending, as it 
must, very largely upon the subjective testimony of the plaintiff; and . . . to 
allow recovery for it might open too wide a door for false claimants who have 
suffered no real harm at all.170 
The Buckley Court also recognized the problem: 
But how can one determine from the external circumstance of exposure 
whether, or when, a claimed strong emotional reaction to an increased 
mortality risk (say from 23% to 28%) is reasonable and genuine, rather than 
overstated — particularly when the relevant statistics themselves are 
controversial and uncertain (as is usually the case), and particularly since 
neither those exposed nor judges or juries are experts in statistics?171 
These are four main concerns in regards to allowing claims for a fear of 
cancer.  Not only does allowing these causes of action create problems for 
courts in terms of overwhelming them and creating a cause of action that is 
impossible to objectively measure, but they also hurt business by sending them 
 
 165. Rothstein, supra note 150, at 6 (“As many as 80% of new cases are brought by plaintiffs 
who suffer from no physical impairment”); Kim, supra note 159 (“More than 50% of the claims 
are brought by people who were exposed to asbestos but aren’t impaired.”). 
 166. Rothstein, supra note 150, at 7. 
 167. See The Need for Damage Limitation, supra note 3. 
 168. McLeod, supra note 2. 
 169. Klein, supra note 12, at 990.  See Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 557 
(1994) (noting that “the common law restricts recovery for negligent infliction of emotional 
distress on several policy grounds: . . . the possibility of fraudulent claims that are difficult for 
judges and juries to detect . . . .”). 
 170. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A cmt. b (1965). 
 171. Metro-North Commuter Ry. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 435 (1997) (emphasis in 
original). 
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into bankruptcy and people who truly are suffering from a physical disease and 
are forced to get damages from a depleted, if not empty, pool. 
However, this is just one view of suits for emotional distress in general and 
asbestos suits in particular.  The Respondents presented a dramatically 
different view. 
B. Freeman Ayers, Doyle Johnson, Clifford Vance, Carl Butler, John Shirley, 
and James Spangler 
1. Argument Submitted by Respondents to the Supreme Court 
The plaintiffs in the original suits, the respondents before the Supreme 
Court, rejected N&W’s claim that they could not recover for fear of cancer 
without physical manifestation.172  They had three main arguments for their 
assertion. 
First, recognizing that “FELA does not itself answer the question of the 
scope of physical and mental injuries for which a negligent defendant is 
liable,” the respondents turned to “settled common law principles.”173  
According to the respondents, “under settled tort law, a defendant who 
negligently causes physical injury to the person of another is liable for the 
resulting physical and mental harms, including reasonable apprehension of 
future physical consequences.”174  Settled tort law does not, though, require a 
physical manifestation of mental harms as long as the mental harms are 
“related to a physical injury, reasonable, and like injuries of any kind, 
supported by evidence sufficient to sustain a jury verdict.”175  Respondents 
agreed with N&W that pain and suffering can stem directly from a physical 
injury but asserted that pain and suffering are “not strictly confined to such 
immediate, direct pain.”176  According to tort law, when “a cause of action [is] 
established by the physical harm, ‘parasitic’ damages are awarded, and it is 
considered that there is sufficient assurance that the mental injury is not being 
feigned.”177  Therefore, emotional damages that would not be enough to 
 
 172. See Respondents’ Brief, supra note 18, at 9-11. 
 173. Id. at 14. 
 174. Id. at 13. 
 175. Id. at 17. 
 176. Id. at 14.  See also Herbert F. Goodrich, Emotional Disturbance as Legal Damage, 20 
MICH. L. REV. 497, 509 (1921) (“In connection with proved physical injury, wrongfully caused 
[emotional disturbance] has long been an element in recovery, not merely where 
undistinguishable from ‘physical pain,’ but in further removed situations . . . .”). 
 177. Respondents’ Brief, supra note 18, at 14 (citing WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF 
THE LAW OF TORTS 213 (1941)). 
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establish liability on their own can be considered “parasitic” damages if they 
result from a physical harm.178 
Noting that cases involving a fear of cancer from asbestos exposure did not 
exist at the time FELA was enacted, respondents turned to analogous situations 
in case law, mainly dog bite cases.179  In these cases, courts allowed recovery 
“for the physical wounding of the immediate bite and for the fear of future 
disease [rabies, lockjaw] caused by the possibility that harmful gems were 
injected into the victim’s bloodstream” and also for “mental injury based on 
fear of future disease, wholly apart from the physical harm [and immediate 
mental harm] caused by the initial wounding itself.”180 
Respondents next maintained that asbestosis supplied the “requisite 
physical injury,” and their fear of cancer was “sufficiently related to asbestosis 
to be a legitimate additional aspect of damages.”181  As previously mentioned, 
asbestosis is a debilitating lung disease that is caused by exposure to 
asbestos.182  At trial “there was substantial evidence of respondents’ significant 
asbestos exposure at [N&W’s] employment” as well as support of the 
diagnosis of respondents’ asbestosis from a “Board-certified medical 
expert.”183  Thus, to respondents it appeared that the asbestosis supplied the 
requisite physical injury. 184 
Respondents contended that the relationship between their asbestosis and 
their fear of cancer was legitimate and sufficient in two respects.  First, 
“asbestosis [was] what [made] respondents’ fear of cancer reasonable” because 
“a present injury of asbestosis makes it more likely than it otherwise would be 
that a particular plaintiff who has been exposed to asbestos will eventually 
develop cancer.”185  This relationship between asbestosis and developing 
cancer is substantial, as “10 percent of individuals with asbestosis contract 
 
 178. See id. at 14-15; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 456 (“If the actor’s 
negligent conduct has so caused any bodily harm to another as to make him liable for it, the actor 
is also subject to liability for . . . fright, shock, or other emotional disturbance resulting from the 
bodily harm or the conduct which causes it . . . .”). 
 179. See Respondents’ Brief, supra note 18, at 15-17. 
 180. Id. at 16.  See Ayers v. Macoughtry, 117 P. 1088, 1090 (Okla. 1911) (upholding jury 
instructions allowing jury, in determining the amount of damages, to “take into consideration the 
apprehension of poisoning from the bite of said dog and the fear of evil results therefrom”); Buck 
v. Brady, 73 A. 277, 279 (Md. 1909) (proper for plaintiff to testify that he worried about rabies); 
Heintz v. Caldwell, 16 Ohio C.C. 630, 630 (Ohio Cir. 1898) available at 1898 WL 588 (“The 
court also erred in not permitting the plaintiff to testify to the mental suffering consequent upon 
her apprehensions of hydrophobia and lockjaw resulting from the dogs biting her.”). 
 181. Respondents’ Brief, supra note 18, at 18. 
 182. See supra text accompanying notes 56-62. 
 183. Respondents’ Brief, supra note 18, at 18. 
 184. See id. at 19. 
 185. Id. at 19-20. 
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mesothelioma . . . ; 39 percent of those with asbestosis who also smoke 
contract fatal lung cancer, while the rate for nonsmokers with asbestosis is 2-5 
percent . . . .”186 
The second aspect of the relationship between respondents’ asbestosis and 
their present fear of cancer was that both stemmed from the same thing, 
asbestos exposure.187  Respondents sought relief “not for a future physical 
injury [cancer], but for their present mental injury, which exists whether or not 
that future physical injury occurs.”188  Therefore, the fact that asbestosis and 
cancer are separate diseases was irrelevant, and N&W was “mistaken that [a] 
reasonable fear of cancer is not recoverable because ‘asbestosis and cancer are 
separate diseases.’”189  Allowing plaintiffs to recover for present mental 
injuries “avoid[s] the unfairness that would otherwise result because many 
current victims of asbestosis would be unlikely ever to be made whole for their 
present mental injuries, such as those victims who die of asbestosis or other 
causes before cancer occurs or a lawsuit can be brought.”190 
Respondents’ last argument was that they were seeking recovery for 
“parasitic damages,” mental injuries that were “simply an additional aspect of 
damages for a tort cause of action otherwise established,” and there is no 
precedent in the common law requiring physical manifestation for parasitic 
damages.191  Had they been seeking recovery for a stand-alone emotional 
distress claim, one where the emotional distress itself was the injury claimed, 
respondents agreed with N&W that the mental injury would have to be 
“severe,” often with accompanying physical manifestations.192  However, such 
was not the case, as respondents were seeking emotional distress damages in 
connection with their physical injury. 
2. Judicial Support for Respondents’ Argument 
Respondents also listed cases in support of their view that recovery for 
emotional distress damages can be had without accompanying physical 
manifestation.193  It is interesting to note that none are from circuit courts of 
 
 186. Id. at 20. 
 187. See id. (emphasis original). 
 188. Respondents’ Brief, supra note 18, at 22.  Respondents once again returned to the dog 
bite analogy.  This same reasoning allowed for recovery for fear of developing rabies after a dog 
bite.  See id.  “It is also . . . the same distinction that defines the essential difference between the 
independent torts of assault (apprehension of a harmful contact) and battery (harmful contact).”  
Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 13, 18, 21). 
 189. Id. at 21. 
 190. Id. at 22. 
 191. Id. at 26-28. 
 192. See id. 
 193. Respondents’ Brief, supra note 18, at 22. 
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appeals or states’ highest courts.  In an unpublished opinion, Griffin v. Keene 
Corp.,194 Griffin filed an asbestosis suit in which he was also seeking damages 
for his fear of cancer, the district court found that because Griffin was “seeking 
recovery for a present fear of cancer, which allegedly stem[med] from his 
exposure to defendants’ products,” Griffin would be able to “point to an actual 
physical injury causing his emotional distress.”195  This was assuming Griffin 
could prove that he had asbestosis and that “his fear of cancer was 
reasonable.”196 
In Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc. v. Cox, Sr.,197 the defendant company, a 
manufacturer of asbestos, sought to have a jury verdict in favor of Cox, who 
was suffering from asbestosis and a fear of cancer, overturned.198  The court 
recognized both that “asbestosis does not cause cancer” and that there was “a 
physical injury requirement for a mental distress from fear of cancer claim.”199  
However, because a plaintiff with asbestosis may have increased chances of 
contracting cancer, “plaintiffs with asbestosis may have a well-founded greater 
reason to fear contracting cancer than those who do not have asbestosis,” and 
thus the physical injury requirement was met by virtue of Cox’s asbestosis.200 
3. Public Policy Support for Respondents’ Argument 
While some judges and scholars believe that allowing recovery for fear of 
cancer is bad from a policy perspective,201 there is a different school of thought 
that the ensuing evils from allowing such claims have not and will not come to 
manifest themselves.  First, regarding the fear that asbestos cases, including 
cases for a fear of cancer, are overwhelming the courts, some judges have 
found that this simply is not the case.  As the Supreme Court of Nebraska 
pointed out, “experience shows that . . . courts have not been overwhelmed 
with litigation.”202  In addition, a fear of a flood of litigation is not a valid fear, 
for the purpose of the courts is to handle litigation. 
It is the business of the law to remedy wrongs that deserve it, even at the 
expense of a “flood of litigation”; and it is a pitiful confession of incompetence 
 
 194. Griffin v. Keene Corp., No. 85 C 10748, 1990 WL 93292 (N.D. Ill. 1990). 
 195. Id. at *1. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc. v. Cox, Sr., 481 So. 2d 517 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985). 
 198. See id. at 519. 
 199. Id. at 528. 
 200. Id. 
 201. See supra notes 150-71 and accompanying text. 
 202. James v. Lieb, 375 N.W.2d 109, 117 (Neb. 1985). 
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on the part of any court of justice to deny relief upon the ground that it will 
give the courts too much work to do.203 
One court has commented that “the proper remedy for a potential flood of 
litigation in the toxic tort context is ‘an expansion of the judicial machinery, 
not a decrease in the availability of justice.’”204  Justice Ginsburg has also 
dismissed this potential flood of litigation, saying that “[i]t is doubtful that 
many legions in the universe of individuals ever exposed to toxic material 
could demonstrate that their employers negligently exposed them to a known 
hazardous substance, and thereby substantially increased the risk that they 
would suffer debilitating or deadly disease.”205 
Many of these same commentators maintain that allowing recovery for fear 
of cancer will not lead to difficulty in distinguishing between valid distress and 
fear that is trivial.  Because “mental and emotional distress is just as ‘real’ as 
physical pain, . . . its valuation is no more difficult.”206  “While physical 
manifestation of the psychological injury may be highly persuasive, such proof 
is not necessary given the current state of medical science and the advances in 
psychology.”207  Requiring physical manifestation before a plaintiff can 
recover for fear of cancer is not an effective method of keeping trivial claims 
out of the courts, for plaintiffs with a physical manifestation “can fake 
emotional distress as well as someone who does not.”208  This rule also leads to 
arbitrary results, as “the plaintiff’s ability to collect for the fear of contracting 
cancer at a future date turns on the plaintiff’s physiological idiosyncrasies 
rather than on whether his distress is genuine or reasonable.”209 
VII.  NORFOLK & WESTERN RAILWAY CO. V. AYERS - THE COURT’S OPINION 
A. Majority Opinion 
Justice Ginsburg wrote the majority opinion in which Justices Stevens, 
Scalia, Souter, and Thomas joined in respect to the “question whether the trial 
 
 203. Schultz v. Barberton Glass Co., 447 N.E.2d 109, 111 (Ohio 1983) (citing William L. 
Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 MICH. L. REV. 874, 877 
(1939)). 
 204. Kenneth W. Miller, Toxic Torts and Emotional Distress: The Case for an Independent 
Cause of Action for Fear of Future Harm, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 681, 691 (1998) (citing Battalla v. 
State, 176 N.E.2d 729, 731 (N.Y. 1961)). 
 205. Metro-North Commuter Ry. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 454 (1997) (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
 206. Miller, supra note 204, at 700 (citing Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8, 15 (N.J. 1979)). 
 207. James, 375 N.W.2d at 116. 
 208. Klein, supra note 12, at 974. 
 209. Id. (citing Glen Donath, Comment, Curing CancerPhobia Phobia: Reasonableness 
Redefined, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1113, 1124 (1995)). 
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judge correctly stated the law when he charged the jury that an asbestosis 
claimant, upon demonstrating a reasonable fear of cancer stemming from his 
present disease, could recover for that fear as apart of asbestosis-related pain 
and suffering damages.”210  The Court was unanimous in its decision regarding 
apportionment of damages.211 
In deciding the first question, the majority began with a summary of both 
Gottshall and Buckley.212  Recognizing that these two cases distinguished 
between “stand-alone emotional distress claim not provoked by any physical 
injury, for which recovery is sharply circumscribed by the zone-of danger 
test[,] . . . and emotional distress claims brought on by a physical injury, for 
which pain and suffering recovery is permitted,” the majority categorized this 
particular claim in the latter category because “asbestosis is a cognizable injury 
under the FELA,” it was undisputed “that the [plaintiffs] suffer[ed] from 
asbestosis,” and “asbestosis can be a clinically serious, often disabling, and 
progressive disease.”213 
The majority then traced the origin of the general rule that “claims for pain 
and suffering associated with . . . a physical injury are traditionally 
compensable.”214  In 1908, at the time of the enactment of FELA, “the 
common law had evolved to encompass apprehension of future harm as a 
component of pain and suffering,” and that rule has now evolved so that one 
may recover for “reasonable fears of a future disease.”215  To illustrate, the 
majority used the dog-bite analogy, previously mentioned in the discussion of 
plaintiffs’ argument.216  For further support for its decision, the majority 
looked to the common law, stating that, of the courts to consider whether fear 
of cancer is compensable for an asbestosis plaintiff, “a clear majority” allow 
for recovery.217 
The majority then took on some of the arguments offered by N&W and the 
dissent.  First, that “because the asbestosis [plaintiffs] may bring a second 
action if cancer develops, . . . cancer-related damages are unwarranted in [this] 
asbestosis suit.”218  The majority dismissed this argument because the plaintiffs 
“sought damages for their current injury, which, they allege[d], encompasse[d] 
 
 210. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Ayers, 123 S. Ct. 1210, 1217 (2003). 
 211. See id. at 1214.  As mentioned earlier, this note will not discuss the apportionment issue.  
See supra note 44. 
 212. See Ayers, 123 S. Ct. at 1217-18. 
 213. Id. at 1218 (internal quotations omitted). 
 214. Id. at 1219. 
 215. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 216. See id. 
 217. Ayers, 123 S. Ct at 1220 (citing fifteen state and federal decisions allowing such 
recovery). 
 218. Id. at 1221 (referring to this as the separate disease rule). 
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a present fear that the toxic exposure causative of asbestosis may later result in 
cancer.”219  That is, the plaintiffs were not seeking to recover for cancer, but 
for their fear that they may someday develop cancer.  The majority then took 
on the argument that “[t]o be compensable as pain and suffering, . . . a mental 
or emotional harm must have been directly brought about by a physical 
injury,” and asbestosis does not directly bring about cancer.220  According to 
the majority, however, this causation requirement is met because “there is an 
undisputed relationship between exposure to asbestos sufficient to cause 
asbestosis, and asbestos-related cancer.”221  The majority then addressed the 
argument that “holding employers liable to workers merely exposed to 
asbestos would risk unlimited and unpredictable liability.”222  The majority 
looked to the distinction drawn by the Buckley Court: that emotional distress 
recovery is available only for “plaintiffs who suffer from a disease” and not 
those who were merely exposed to asbestos, because “of those exposed to 
asbestos, only a fraction will develop asbestosis.”223 
Therefore, to the question presented: “[w]hether a plaintiff who has 
asbestosis but not cancer can recover damages for fear of cancer under the 
[FELA] without proof of physical manifestations of the claimed emotional 
distress,” the majority answered yes, with one “important reservation.”224  
Such a plaintiff can recover for fear of cancer as long as he proves “that his 
alleged fear is genuine and serious.”225  The majority admitted that “in this 
case, proof directed to that matter was notably thin.”226  However, the jury 
forms made it impossible to tell which parts of the awards, if any, were 
attributed to the plaintiffs’ fear of developing cancer, so it was unknown if the 
jury thought the plaintiffs’ fears “genuine or serious.”227  Therefore, the 
judgment of the West Virginia court was affirmed.228 
B. Justice Kennedy’s Dissent 
Justice Kennedy wrote the main dissent on the issue of whether damages 
for fear of cancer could be recovered by plaintiffs suffering from asbestosis, 
 
 219. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. at 1222. 
 222. Ayers,123 S. Ct. at 1223 (internal quotations omitted). 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. at 1224. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Ayers, 123 S. Ct. at 1224. 
 228. Id. at 1228. 
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joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O’Connor and Breyer.229  The 
dissent first pointed out that though the decision by the majority “might appear 
on the surface to be solicitous of employees and thus consistent with the goals 
of FELA,” this reasoning did not hold up under scrutiny.230  Because asbestos 
related cancers take years to develop231 and companies that are culpable for 
these cancers are being forced into bankruptcy by asbestos litigation,232 there is 
a “danger that no compensation will be available for those with severe injuries 
caused by asbestos.”233  Therefore “allow[ing] recovery for fear of future 
illness is antithetical to FELA’s goals of ensuring compensation for 
injuries.”234 
While the dissent did agree with the majority’s conclusion that “a person 
who suffers from a disease may recover for all related emotional distress,” it 
contended that related “emotional distress must be the direct consequence of an 
injury of condition.”235  Here, the emotional distress, plaintiffs’ fear of cancer, 
was not caused by asbestosis because “[t]here is no demonstrated causal link 
between asbestosis and cancer.”236  Therefore fear of cancer is not a direct 
consequence of asbestosis. 
The dissent also disagreed with the majority’s analysis of other courts 
decisions in fear of cancer cases and in the majority’s analysis of the separate 
disease rule.237  To the dissent, the separate disease rule demonstrated “that 
courts have found it necessary to construct fair and sensible common-law rules 
for resolving the problems particular to asbestos litigation . . . [and] that a 
person with asbestosis will not be without a remedy for pain and suffering 
caused by cancer.”238  Allowing plaintiffs to recover for asbestosis when they 
develop asbestosis and later to recover for cancer when (and if) they develop 
cancer “accounts . . . for changes already underway in common-law rules for 
 
 229. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  The dissent would also 
disallow recovery if recovery had been sought for negligent infliction of emotional distress.  Id. at 
1234 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  However, plaintiffs sought 
recovery for “negligently inflicted physical injury (asbestosis) and attendant pain and suffering.”  
Id. at 1219.  This note, therefore, will not delve into this part of the dissent’s analysis. 
 230. Id. at 1228-29 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 231. Id. at 1229 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see supra note 66 and 
accompanying text. 
 232. Ayers, 123 S. Ct. at 1229-30 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see 
supra notes 159-63 and accompanying text. 
 233. Ayers, 123 S. Ct. at 1229 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 234. Id. at 1230 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 235. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 236. Id. at 1231 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 237. See id. at 1232 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 238. Ayers, 123 S. Ct. at 1232 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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compensating victims of a disease with a long latency period . . . [and] is more 
likely to result in an equitable allotment of compensation.”239 
C. Justice Breyer’s Dissent 
Justice Breyer agreed with the dissent, but wrote separately “[b]ecause the 
issue [wa]s a close and difficult one.”240  His main contention with the 
majority’s decision was its partial reliance on the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts because it “neither gives a definition of the kind of emotional disturbance 
for which recovery is available nor otherwise states that recovery is available 
for any kind of emotional disturbance whatsoever.”241  The majority, therefore, 
should have looked “to the underlying factors that have helped to shape related 
‘emotional distress’ rules,” which “argue for the kind of liability limitation” as 
described in Justice Kennedy’s dissent.242 
VIII.  ANALYSIS 
Obviously the respondents in this case are sympathetic.  Because of their 
asbestosis, they “just can’t breathe,” feel like they are “gonna fall dead,” and 
“run plum out of breath” when talking.243 They certainly should be 
compensated for their asbestosis, a disease that is physically impairing them.  
This is especially true since N&W learned of the public health hazards of 
asbestos exposure in the workplace beginning in the 1930s, and all of the 
respondents worked for N&W well after the 1930s.244  Whether or not they 
should be compensated for the present fear of developing cancer, without any 
physical manifestation of that fear, is a different question, though.  The 
Supreme Court’s decisions in Gottshall and Buckley can give guidance for one 
possible solution. 
In both Gottshall and Buckley, the Court recognized that FELA was to 
provide compensation, not only for employees’ physical injuries but also for 
their emotional injuries.245  However, the two Courts, along with the dissenters 
in Ayers, were also careful that their decisions would not create an unlimited 
 
 239. Id. at 1233 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 240. Id. at 1236 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 241. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis in original) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
 242. Id. at 1237 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 243. See Respondents’ Brief, supra note 18, at 6-7. 
 244. Id. at 5 n.4. 
 245. See Metro-North Commuter Ry. Co. v. Buckley, 521 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1997) (following 
Gottshall’s precedent and treating an emotional injury as an “injury” under FELA); Consol. Rail 
Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 556 (1994) (recognizing that while FELA “may have been 
primarily focused on physical injury, it refers simply to ‘injury,’ which may encompass both 
physical and emotional injury.”). 
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class of plaintiffs.  For example, in Gottshall, the Court expressed concern with 
the “prospect that allowing such suits [for negligently inflicted emotional 
distress] can lead to unpredictable and nearly infinite liability for 
defendants.”246  Both Courts were also concerned with making rules that would 
force judges “to make highly subjective determinations concerning the 
authenticity of claims for emotional injury . . . .”247 
Keeping these concerns in mind, one possible solution is to keep 
Gottshall’s zone of danger test in place for emotional distress claims by 
“plaintiffs who sustain a physical impact as a result of a defendant’s negligent 
conduct or who are placed in immediate risk of physical harm by that 
conduct.”248  However, for plaintiffs who suffer a physical injury and bring suit 
for infliction of emotional distress for fear of a future disease, courts should 
require physical manifestations of that distress unless plaintiffs can prove that 
the physical injury from which they currently suffer could actually result in the 
feared disease.  This is in keeping with the rule laid out by the Ayers Court that 
a plaintiff’s fear be “genuine and serious,” for if an injury could not actually 
result in the feared disease, that fear could be neither genuine nor serious. 249  
For example, in the case at hand, because respondents did not have physical 
manifestation of their fear of cancer and could not prove that asbestosis could 
cause cancer,250 they would be denied recovery.251 
 
 246. Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 552.  The Court also limited the plaintiff class by adopting the 
zone of danger test.  See id. at 555.  The Buckley Court reiterated Gottshall’s concern of “a threat 
of ‘unlimited and unpredictable liability.’”  Buckley, 521 U.S. at 433 (citing Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 
557). 
 247. Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 552; see also Buckley, 521 U.S. at 433. 
 248. Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 547-48. 
 249. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Ayers, 123 S. Ct. 1210, 1224 (2003). 
 250. They would not be able to prove that asbestosis could cause cancer since the two are 
“separate and distinct latent diseases that are not medically linked.”  See supra note 68 and 
accompanying text.  Respondents seem to forget that since asbestosis does not cause cancer, their 
asbestosis cannot lead to a reasonable fear of developing cancer.  See Respondents’ Brief, supra 
note 18, at 10 (stating the “reasonableness of [respondents’] fear, arising from their asbestosis, 
that they may suffer in the future from two painful and potentially fatal forms of cancer . . .”).  Id.  
Nor does respondents’ dog bite analogy fit the facts of the case at hand, for a dog bite actually can 
cause rabies, whereas asbestosis cannot cause cancer.  See supra notes 179-80 and accompanying 
text. 
 251. Consider other examples: Plaintiff gets pricked by a used needle at a hospital and then 
fears that she may develop HIV.  She would have an emotional distress claim against the hospital 
under the proposed solution even if she had no physical manifestation of emotional distress since 
the physical injury from which she suffered (being pricked by a used needle) actually could 
actually result in the feared disease (HIV).  Plaintiff gets bit by neighbor’s dog and then fears that 
he may develop rabies.  He would have an emotional distress claim against the neighbor even 
without physical manifestation of emotional distress since the physical injury (the dog bite) 
actually could result in the feared disease (rabies). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
396 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:367 
 
This solution is sound for a number of reasons.  First, it requires that 
plaintiffs being awarded damages for the emotional distress truly are suffering 
an injury from that distress.  It is safe to say that someone who is diagnosed as 
severely depressed252 or requires prescription medication for chest pains and 
headaches brought about by emotional distress253 is presently injured from his 
or her emotional distress.  Likewise, someone with the knowledge that his or 
her current physical injury could actually result in another disease “must 
necessarily have a most depressing effect upon the injured person.  Like the 
sword of Damocles, he knows not when it will fall.”254 
Second, this solution is in line with the concerns listed in Gottshall, 
Buckley, and the in Ayers’s dissent.  It keeps in mind FELA’s purpose of 
providing compensation for employees’ emotional, as well as physical, 
injuries.255  It also helps to limit the class of plaintiffs by putting some 
restrictions on who can bring a claim for a fear of a future disease.  
Additionally, it provides some guidelines for judges and juries so they will not 
be forced to make highly subjective decisions. 
Third, this solution is in keeping with public policy.  By limiting the 
number of plaintiffs who could bring suit for emotional distress damages, 
courts would not be faced with such a “flood” of litigation.  Not only would 
courts see their caseloads somewhat reduced, defendant companies would have 
fewer claims filed against them, leading to fewer bankruptcies being filed.  
Fewer claims against defendant companies and fewer bankruptcies being filed 
by these same companies would help to ensure that unimpaired plaintiffs, by 
not recovering from emotional distress claims, would not cause those who are 
truly sick and suffering to face a depleted pool of assets.  The proposed 
solution would also help to set a standard for distinguishing valid from invalid 
claims.  A plaintiff would not have a valid claim unless he or she could 
demonstrate some physical manifestation or that his or her current disease 
could lead to a future disease.  This would preserve the fact-finding role of the 
jury while keeping them from having to make overly subjective 
determinations. 
Lastly, this solution is consistent with FELA.  As mentioned above, 
FELA’s purpose is to compensate for injuries to employees, whether physical 
or emotional.256  This solution achieves the statute’s goal by helping to ensure 
that emotional distress injuries really are “injuries,” that is, that the employee 
is objectively suffering a mental harm.  FELA then allows compensation for 
 
 252. See Vance v. Consol. Rail Corp., 652 N.E.2d 776, 780 (Ohio 1995). 
 253. See Alabama Great S. Ry. Co. v. Jackson, 587 So. 2d 959, 961-62 (Ala. 1991). 
 254. Alley v. Charlotte Pipe & Foundry Co., 74 S.E.2d 885, 886 (N.C. 1912). 
 255. See supra notes 72-81 and accompanying text. 
 256. See supra notes 72-81 and accompanying text. 
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those injuries.  Also, because of FELA’s “remedial and humanitarian purpose,” 
courts have been liberal in their construction of FELA.257  By allowing for two 
different manners in which recovery for emotional distress could be recovered, 
the proposed solution is liberally construing the statute.  Furthermore, FELA 
“generally turns on principles of common law.”258  Because some states adhere 
to a rule requiring physical manifestation before recovery can be had for 
emotional distress, this rule is in keeping with the common law.259 
This proposed solution balances the concerns of both plaintiffs and 
defendants.  It allows claims for emotional distress for fear of a future disease 
to be brought, but only by those actually suffering from emotional distress.  
Yet it continues to hold companies liable for the emotional distress they 
actually have caused.  It is mindful of the concerns expressed by the Supreme 
Court in Gottshall, Buckley, and by the dissenters in Ayers, and it is in 
accordance with FELA. 
IX.  CONCLUSION 
By allowing asbestosis-inflicted plaintiffs to recover emotional distress 
damages for the fear of developing cancer, a disease that is not caused by 
asbestosis, the Supreme Court in Ayers did nothing to meaningfully help slow 
the flood of asbestos litigation, to help defendant companies from declaring 
bankruptcy, or to help retain a limited pool of resources is for truly ill 
plaintiffs.  Instead, such plaintiffs who are able to show that they manifest a 
fear of developing cancer, an illogical fear because asbestosis does not lead to 
cancer, will be able to recover for this fear.  The asbestos litigation in this 
country has gotten out of hand and does not appear to be improving.  The 
Court in Ayers had the opportunity to start steering this in the right direction.  
Instead, it chose to accelerate many of the problems associated with asbestos 
litigation. 
KATIE NESTER* 
 
 257. Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, at 181-82 (1949). 
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